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to do. And nothing of this kind could occur if our will to act were at all times "given us without any efforts of ours".

VI. We have thus obtained the object of our introspective investigation. And the result turns out to be the reverse of that which was looked for. It is, however, a result which may be said to be scientifically certain; for it has been obtained by the process of observing and re-observing the *facts* of the subject, and its correctness is guaranteed by the facts, which may be observed again and again, and have been so observed until what may be called complete practical verification has been obtained. While these facts were viewed and spoken of in the confused and erroneous manner in which in various ways they have been viewed and spoken of by philosophers and by mankind in general, it was impossible that the mental process by which we form determinations should be ascertained. It was by obtaining step by step, and by slow degrees, correct and clear perceptions of the nature of the mental facts which occur in this process, that the process was analysed. And now that it is analysed, the facts of it are seen to be extremely simple, although they appeared mysterious and inscrutable before—as all facts are while they are not understood and cannot be pointed out.

Many highly important consequences follow from the correct view of the subject which has thus been obtained, and many comments upon it may be made. But the consideration of these must be reserved. In the meantime, the reader has now before him, so far, in a short compass, the result of years of careful investigation.

HENRY TRAVIS.

III.—HEDONISM AND ULTIMATE GOOD.

It has often been observed that systematic enquiry into the nature of the Supreme End of human action, the *Bonum* or *Summum Bonum*, belongs almost exclusively to ancient ethical speculation; and that in modern ethics its place is supplied by an investigation of the fundamental Moral Laws, or Imperatives of the Practical Reason. While the ancients appear as chiefly endeavouring to determine the proper ultimate object of rational pursuit, the moderns are chiefly occupied in discussing the basis and validity of a received code of rules, for the most part restrictive rather than directive of human effort. But though this difference has frequently been noticed, I am not aware that any distinct explanation of it has ever been offered: while again there are many signs that ethical speculation in England has reached a point at which this old question as to the nature of

Ultimate Good again presents itself as fundamental. If these signs are not misleading, it will be interesting to ascertain, from a comparison between ancient and modern thought, how far the speculative excursion which has ended in conveying us back to the old problem has brought us to face it from a new point of view, and under new conditions.

When we compare the Greek investigation of Ultimate Good with our own, we find an important difference in the very form of the fundamental question. What we, as moralists, are naturally led to seek, is the true account of *general* good; for most of us almost unhesitatingly assume that moral action, as such, must have relation to universal ends. But for the Greek moralist, the primary question as naturally and inevitably took an egoistic form.* The Good which he studied was 'good for himself,' or for any other individual philosophic soul, enquiring after the true way of life. This difference is sufficiently obvious and has been noticed by more than one writer; but it has perhaps been somewhat obscured for modern readers by the antithetical fact, to which more attention has been drawn, that the political speculation of Greece differs from our own precisely in its non-individualistic character. There is really no contradiction between the assumption in ethics of the agent's private good as the ultimate determinant of rational action; and the assumption in politics of the good of the state—without regard to any 'natural rights' of its component parts—as the ultimate end and standard of right political organisation. Indeed it would not be difficult to show that the two assumptions naturally belong to the same stage in the development of practical philosophy. Still they have somewhat tended to confuse each other, through that blending of politics with ethics in philosophical discussion which characterises the period from Socrates to Aristotle; and the confusion has been further increased by the analogy between the Individual and the State, which forms the basis of Plato's most famous treatise. This very analogy, however, when carefully examined, brings out most strikingly the characteristic which it, at first, tends to obscure; for the individual man being considered as a polity of impulses, his good is made to consist essentially in the due ordering of the internal relations of this polity, and is only secondarily and indirectly realised in the relations of this complex individual to other men. And in Aristotle's detailed

* This statement requires some qualification in so far as it concerns Plato, on account of his peculiar ontology. Still this does not so much affect the question Plato asked, as the answer he gave to it, and even that only to a limited extent; not (*e. g.*) in the *Philebus*, where the *ἀγαθόν* investigated is just the *ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν* of Aristotle.

analysis of the moral ideal of his age, the fundamental egoism of the form in which it is conceived is continually illustrated, in striking contrast to the modern tendency to regard "the scope and object of ethics as altogether social".* The limits of Aristotle's Liberality are not determined by any consideration of its effect on the welfare of its recipients, but by an intuitive sense of the noble and graceful quality of expenditure that is free without being too lavish; and his Courageous warrior is not commended as devoting himself for his country, but as attaining for himself, even amid pains and death, the peculiar *καλόν* of a courageous act.

No doubt we must bear in mind that this egoism is chiefly formal. The orthodox moralist, from Prodicus to Chrysippus, in recommending the preference of Virtue to Pleasure, is substantially recommending the sacrifice of individual inclinations to social claims; and the explicit "*communis utilitas nostræ anteponeuda*" of later Stoicism, (which in this respect forms a transition from the ancient point of view to the modern), is no doubt implicit in the practical teaching of earlier schools. Still the effect of the egoistic form is very clearly seen in the actual course of ethical discussion. It rendered it absolutely necessary for the orthodox moralist to settle the relation of the individual's virtue to his Pleasure and Pain. A modern moralist may leave this undetermined. He cannot of course overlook the paramount influence of pleasure and pain, in the actual determination of human actions; and he must be aware that the obtaining of future pleasure and the avoiding of future pain constitute at least the chief part of the common notion of 'happiness,' 'interest,' 'good on the whole,' or whatever else we call the end which a prudent man, as such, has in view. But he may regard the discussion of this as bearing on the Sanctions of morality, not Morality itself; that is not on the theory of what duty is, but on the practical question how a man is to be made to do his duty. The Greek, however, who regarded the determination of the individual's good as supplying the fundamental principle on which the whole code of rules for reasonable conduct must ultimately depend, was obliged at the outset to consider the popular view that this good was Pleasure. He either, with the Cyrenaics and Epicureans, accepted this view unreservedly, and held Virtue to be valuable merely as a means to the enjoyment of the virtuous agent; or, with Zeno, he rejected it altogether, and maintained the intrinsic valuelessness of pleasure; or with Socrates, Aristotle, and Plato in his soberer moods, he argued the inseparable connection of the best and really pleasantest pleasure with the exercise of

* Cf. MIND III., p. 341.

virtue. The first position was offensive to the moral consciousness; the third imposed on it the necessity of proving what could never be really proved without either dialectical tricks or assumptions obviously transcending experience; and it was not surprising that the chief part of the moral earnestness of ancient society was ultimately enlisted on the side of the second alternative. Still the inhuman severity of the paradox that 'pleasure and pain are indifferent to the wise man,' never failed to have a repellent effect; and the imaginary rack on which an imaginary sage had to be maintained in perfect happiness, was at any rate a dangerous instrument of dialectical torment for the actual philosopher.

Christianity extricated the moral consciousness from this dilemma between base subserviency and inhuman indifference to the feelings of the moral agent. It compromised the long conflict between Virtue and Pleasure, by transferring to another world the fullest realisation of both; thus enabling orthodox morality to assert itself, as reasonable and natural, without denying the concurrent reasonableness and naturalness of the individual's desire for bliss without alloy. Hence when independent ethical speculation recommences in England after the Middle Ages, we find that the dualism—if I may so say—of the Practical Reason, which Butler afterwards formulated, is really implicit in all the orthodox replies to Hobbes. It is not denied in these replies that man's 'natural good' is pleasure, or that the self-love which seeks the agent's greatest happiness is a rational principle of action; they are only concerned to maintain the independent reasonableness of Conscience, and the objective validity of moral rules derived from a quite other source than the calculations of self-interest. Thus, for example, though in Cumberland's view the ultimate end and rational basis of the moral code is "commune bonum omnium rationalium," the obligation of the code on each individual "rational" is imposed "sub pœna felicitatis amittendæ aut propter spem ejusdem acquirendæ". And even Clarke, who is often thought to have carried his argument for the independence of morality up to the point of paradox, is yet after all found to make only the very moderate claim "that Virtue deserves to be chosen for its own sake, and Vice to be avoided, though a man was sure of his own particular *neither to gain nor lose anything by the practice of either*". But since in the actual world "the practice of vice is accompanied with great temptations, and allurements of pleasure and profit, and the practice of virtue is often attended with great calamity, losses, and sometimes with death itself, this alters the question,"—and, in fact, Clarke is of opinion, not only that men under these circumstances will not always prefer

Virtue to Vice, but also that "it is *not very reasonably to be expected* that they should". Butler, however, was the first to give with perfect precision the *differentia* of what we may call broadly the modern view of Ethics, in stating "reasonable self-love and conscience" as the "two chief or superior principles in the nature of man"; whereas it was a fundamental assumption of all the schools of philosophy that sprang from Socrates, that there is *one* naturally "chief or superior principle" in every rational being which impels him to seek his own true good.

It is true that, when any attempt is made to relieve Ethics of its dependence on religion, the old difficulty as to the relation of Virtue to Happiness recurs; but it is no longer in the form of a dispute as to the true nature of the object of rational desire, but rather as the problem of reconciling the desire for one's own Good—good being more or less explicitly understood to be pleasure, enjoyment, satisfaction, agreeable feeling of some kind—with the performance of what reason dictates as Duty. This problem presents itself to most minds as of the very profoundest importance; and I cannot understand how any moralist can turn aside from it, or treat it with indifference. But I quite admit that its solution is not an essential pre-requisite of the construction of a moral code.

On what other principles, then, is this construction to be attempted? It appears to me that on this question there is far more substantial agreement among English moralists than is commonly supposed; and that the fundamental intuitions of conscience or the practical reason on which one school have always laid stress, are merely the expression in different aspects or relations of that ideal subordination of individual impulses to universal ends on which alone Utilitarianism, as a system of ethics, can rationally rest. Thus the essence of Justice or Equity, in so far as it is absolutely obligatory, is that different individuals are not to be treated differently, except on grounds of universal application: which grounds, again, are given in the principle of Rational Benevolence, that sets before each man the good of all others as an object of pursuit no less worthy than his own; while, again, other time-honoured virtues seem to be fitly explained as special manifestations of impartial benevolence under various normal circumstances of human life, or else as habits and dispositions indispensable to the maintenance of rational behaviour under the seductive force of various non-rational impulses. I admit that there are other rules which our common moral sense when first interrogated seems to enunciate as absolutely binding; but I contend that careful and systematic reflection on this very Common Sense, as expressed in the

habitual moral judgments of ordinary men, results in exhibiting the real subordination of these rules to the fundamental principles above given. Then, further, this method of systematising particular virtues and duties receives very strong support from a comparative study of the history of morality; as the variations in the moral code of different societies at different stages correspond, at least generally, to differences in the actual or believed tendencies of certain kinds of conduct to promote the good of society. While, again, the account given by our evolutionists of the pre-historic condition of the moral faculty, which represents it as derived aboriginally from the social instincts, is entirely in harmony with this view. This convergence of several distinct arguments has had, I think, a considerable effect on contemporary thought; and probably a large majority of reflective persons are now prepared to accept 'Common Good' as the ultimate end for which moral rules exist, and the standard by which they are to be co-ordinated and their qualifications and mutual limitations determined.

There remains, no doubt, some difference of view between the converging lines of speculation, as to the whole or community of which the good is to be sought; since from one point of view we should state the end, in Cumberland's phrase, as the "Common Good of Rational or Conscious Beings"; while from another it will be rather the good of the particular race of animals to which we belong. But this difference is easily reduced to latency in the idea of the Good of Humanity, and I do not propose at present to dwell upon it.

But neglecting this, and fixing our attention on the notion of Good, we have to ask whether this is less problematical in the case of humanity generally than Socrates found it to be in the case of the individual man. Have we not, after all, been simply brought round to the point from which ethical speculation started in Europe? If we try to define the Good, how shall we avoid revolving again through the old controversies?

A little reflection will show that we have, at any rate, got rid of one of the competing answers to the old question. We cannot now explain the general Good to consist in general Virtue; that is in the general fulfilment of the prohibitions and prescriptions of Common Sense morality. This would obviously involve us in a logical circle; as we have just settled that the ultimate standard for determining these prohibitions and prescriptions is just this general good.

Thus Pleasure, the other "competitor for the Aristeia," as Plato says, is left without any rival of equally ancient prestige, and in a far better position relatively to ordinary morality. For (1) to regard Virtue merely as a means to the agent's private pleasure

was undoubtedly offensive to the common moral consciousness of mankind. But no similar offence is given by the explanation of the Virtues as various forms and applications of Rational Benevolence, or auxiliary habits (as Courage, Temperance, &c.), necessary to the sustained and effective exercise of Rational Benevolence, amid the various temptations and dangers of human life; while the exercise of Benevolence has always been chiefly understood to mean giving pleasure to others and averting pain from them. And (2) we saw that when Self-love was once clearly distinguished from Conscience, it was naturally understood to mean desire for one's own pleasure; accordingly the interpretation of 'one's own good' which was peculiar in ancient thought to the Cyrenaic and Epicurean heresies, is adopted among the moderns, not only by opponents of independent and intuitive morality from Hobbes to Bentham, but also by the most prominent and approved writers of the Intuitionist School. Indeed, to many of these latter it never seems to have occurred that this notion can have any other interpretation.* If, then, when any one hypothetically concentrates his attention on himself, good is naturally and almost inevitably conceived to be pleasure, it does not appear how the good of any number of human beings, however organised into a community, can be essentially different.

This, then, appears to me to be, in outline, the case for modern Utilitarianism or Universalistic Hedonism, as a study of the history of ethical thought presents it to us. I must now notice briefly the rival doctrines as to the nature of Good which seem to be chiefly maintained at the present time. It appears that Hedonism is attacked from two different points of view, which we may, perhaps, without offence, distinguish as Materialistic and Idealistic; each claiming to substitute an objective standard for the subjective criterion of 'amount of agreeable feeling'. I use 'Materialistic' to denote the view which considers individual men and human societies as Organisms, the condition and functioning of which can be ascertained by external observation, and pronounced good or bad without reference to the series of pleasurable or painful feelings which accompany such functioning. We thus seem to obtain a notion of Well-being or Welfare which may be substituted for Happiness as the ultimate end and standard of right action. Perhaps the notion may be more clearly explained by saying that it is obtained by extending to a race or a community of animals the idea of Health, as commonly attributed to an individual man. In an article in *MIND*, No. I., I mentioned that this view was incidentally adopted by Mr. Darwin in his chapter on the Moral Sense in his *Descent of*

* Cf. Stewart, *Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers*, B. II., c. 1.

Man; and it seems to have been enthusiastically accepted and more fully developed by some of Mr. Darwin's disciples, among whom I may count Mr. Pollock, who replied to my article in No. III. of this journal. I have studied Mr. Pollock's courteous and carefully written answer, and am still unable to see exactly how he deals with the following dilemma. Either this notion of Well-being is entirely resolvable into 'conditions tending to preservation,' or it includes something more. If the latter be admitted, we have to ask what is this something more which distinguishes well-being from mere being. In one place, Mr. Pollock seems to say that it is something at present undefinable: to which I can only answer, in Aristotle's words, that if we cannot get even a proximate definition of it, we shall be "as archers without a mark, rather unlikely to attain the needful". If, however, he falls back on the former alternative, as certainly other writers of his school seem disposed to do, and says that well-being is merely "Being with the promise of future being," he surely comes into irreconcilable conflict with common sense. I do not wish to exaggerate this conflict. I admit that the most important part of the function of morality consists in maintaining habits and sentiments which seem necessary to the continued existence, in full numbers, of a society of human beings under actual circumstances; and that this part may easily be regarded as the whole, if we consider morality merely as a code of restrictive regulations—the aspect which has been most prominent in modern times. But this maintenance of preservative habits and sentiments surely does not exhaust our ideal of good or desirable human life. We are not content with mere Being, however secured in continuance, for ourselves or for those we love or, in so far as we are philanthropists, for humanity generally. What we demand more, may be expressed by the general notion of Culture; and though some part of what is included in this notion may fairly be interpreted as Preservative Tendencies, there is surely much that cannot possibly be so interpreted. If the Hedonistic view of Culture, as consisting in the development of susceptibilities for refined pleasure of various kinds, be rejected, it must be in favour of what I have called the Idealistic view: in which we regard the ideal objects on the realisation of which our most refined pleasures depend—Knowledge, or Beauty in its different forms, or a certain ideal of human relations (whether thought of as Freedom or otherwise)—as constituting in themselves ultimate Good, apart from the pleasures which depend upon their pursuit and attainment. I do not propose at present to criticise this view, chiefly because I am not acquainted with any philosophical exposition of it sufficiently coherent and systematic

to invite criticism ; though it seems to be pretty widely accepted among cultivated persons, and more or less definitely suggested in the anti-hedonistic arguments of certain philosophical writers. But it may be well to define clearly the manner in which Hedonism, as I conceive it, deals with this view.

The Hedonistic argument against the assumption of 'objective' ultimate ends, just as that against particular moral rules of absolute validity, seems to me to consist necessarily of two parts. It appeals to the immediate intuition of reflective persons ; and secondly to the results of a comprehensive comparison of the ordinary judgments of mankind. The second argument comes in rather by way of confirmation of the first, and obviously cannot be made completely cogent ; since, as above stated, several cultivated persons do habitually judge that certain ideal goods are ends independently of the pleasure derived from them. But we may urge not only that all these ideal goods are productive of pleasure in various ways ; but also that they seem to obtain the commendation of Common Sense, roughly speaking, in proportion to the degree of this productiveness. This seems obviously true of Beauty ; and will hardly be denied in respect of any kind of social ideal, for it is surely paradoxical to maintain that any degree of Freedom, or any form of social order would be desirable even if it tended to impair, instead of promoting, the general happiness. The case of Knowledge is rather more complex ; but certainly Common Sense is most impressed with the value of knowledge, when its 'fruitfulness' has been demonstrated. It is, however, aware that experience has frequently shown how knowledge, long fruitless, may become unexpectedly fruitful, and how light may be shed on one part of the field of knowledge from another apparently remote : and even if any particular branch of scientific pursuit could be shown to be devoid of even this indirect utility, it would still deserve some respect on utilitarian grounds ; both as furnishing to the enquirer the refined and innocent pleasures of curiosity, and because the intellectual disposition which it exhibits and sustains, is likely on the whole to produce fruitful knowledge. Still in cases approximating to this latter, Common Sense is somewhat disposed to complain of the misdirection of valuable effort ; so that the meed of honour commonly paid to Science seems to be graduated, though perhaps unconsciously, by a tolerably exact utilitarian scale. Certainly the moment the legitimacy of any branch of scientific enquiry is seriously disputed, as in the recent case of vivisection, the controversy on both sides is conducted on an avowedly utilitarian basis. Nor does it really make against Hedonism that knowledge and other ideal ends are often most energetically

pursued by persons who do not think of the resulting happiness ; if, as experience seems to show, both the concentration of effort needed for success, and the disposition most favourable to enjoyment, are promoted by this limitation of aim. Nor, finally, need the Hedonist be surprised that the enthusiasm of these pursuits should occasionally prompt to the affirmation that their ends are worthy to be chosen *per se*, even if the pursuits should result in a balance of pain over pleasure. He is only concerned to maintain that, when in a mood of calm reflection we distinguish these ideal objects from the feelings inseparably connected with them, it is the quality of these latter which we see to be the ultimate end of rational desire.

This last proposition I do not find exactly denied, in the terms in which I have stated it ; but an answer is made to it by some writers, which, if valid at all, is certainly conclusive, though indirect. It is said, for example, by Mr. Green* that "pleasure as feeling, in distinction from its conditions which are not feelings, cannot be conceived" ; and therefore, of course, cannot be taken as an end of rational action. Whatever plausibility this argument possesses, seems to depend on that ambiguity in the term 'conceive,' which has caused so much confusion in recent philosophical debate. To adopt an old comparison, Mr. Green's proposition is neither more nor less true than the statement that an angle cannot be 'conceived' apart from its sides. That is, we cannot form the notion of an angle without the notion of sides containing it ; but this does not hinder us from apprehending with perfect definiteness the magnitude of any angle as greater, equal, or less than that of any other, without any comparison of the pairs of containing sides. Similarly, we cannot form the notion of any pleasure existing apart from some "conditions which are not feelings" ; but we can perfectly well compare a pleasure felt under any given conditions with any other, however otherwise conditioned, and pronounce it equal or unequal ; and we surely require no more than this to enable us to take 'amount of pleasure' as our standard for deciding between alternatives of conduct.

Mr. Green, however has another argument against the 'greatest happiness' doctrine, which it will be desirable briefly to notice ; especially since it also supplies the heavy artillery in an elaborate attack on Hedonism in Mr. Bradley's *Ethical Studies* (noticed in the last number of this journal). I will give it in Mr. Green's words taken from the passage quoted above :—

* I quote this sentence from Mr. Green's Introduction to the Vol. II. of Hume's *Treatise on Human Nature*, p. 9 ; but I have found the same argument used in almost the same words by other writers of the same school. Cf. (e.g.) Prof. Caird in *Academy*, June 12, 1874.

"Happiness 'in its full extent,' as 'the utmost pleasure we are capable of,' is an unreal abstraction, if ever there was one. It is curious that those who are most forward to deny the reality of universals in that sense in which they are the condition of all reality, *viz.*, as relations, should yet, having pronounced these to be mere names, be found ascribing reality to a universal, which cannot, without contradiction, be supposed more than a name. Does this 'happiness in its full extent' mean the 'aggregate of possible enjoyment,' of which modern utilitarians tell us? Such a phrase simply represents the vain attempt to get a definite by addition of indefinites. It has no more meaning than 'the greatest possible quantity of time' would have. Pleasant feelings are not quantities that can be added. Each is over before the next begins, and the man who has been pleased a million times is not really better off—has no more of the supposed chief good in possession—than the man who has only been pleased a thousand times. When we speak of pleasures, then, as forming a possible whole, we cannot mean pleasures as feelings."

We may admit that if any one supposed that his 'greatest happiness' was something that could be possessed all at once, it would be important to explain to him that it was composed of elements which could only be had successively. But I must confess myself quite unable to see how it thereby becomes impossible for him to aim at it. The paradoxical character of Mr. Green's argument cannot be better shown than by taking the very analogy which he selects to enforce it. In what sense is it true that 'greatest possible quantity of time' has no meaning? Since when has it been—not merely wrong but—logically impossible to make prolongation of life an end of voluntary effort? And what is 'length of days,' but 'the greatest possible quantity of time' relatively to the individual looking forward? If it is only meant that we cannot have time by itself, without some filling of time, this is of course true; just as it is true that we cannot have pleasure without the conditions on which it depends. But because Time is an abstraction, it is not therefore unreal, nor incapable of furnishing an end of action; we can aim at living as long as possible, without any regard to the manner of our living; and if we turn out centenarians, we shall commonly be thought to have succeeded in our aim. *A fortiori* we can aim at living as pleasantly as possible, without any regard to the inseparable concomitants of our 'greatest possible happiness.' Mr. Green seems to assume that because the parts of Time, and of whatever has Time for its fundamental form, must exist successively, it is therefore illegitimate to conceive them as parts at all; that a 'happy week,' or a 'miserable month,' is something "which cannot without contradiction be supposed more than a name," merely because we cannot have a happy week all in one moment! Surely this is

as singular a metaphysical whim as ever entered into the head of a scholastic philosopher.

I have selected these two arguments for discussion, because they are of a kind that admits of summary treatment. They are either completely cogent or totally valueless; and it does not require many words to enable the reader to decide which view to take. The case is different with other anti-hedonistic topics, such as the difficulties of estimating the amount of pleasure or pain, comparing the amount of different pleasures, &c. It is, on the one hand, impossible not to allow a certain weight to such objections: on the other hand, they hardly even claim to be decisive; and, in fact, seem rather directed against the practicability of constructing a Hedonistic Calculus, than against the truth of the Hedonistic doctrine as to the nature of Ultimate Good.

H. SIDGWICK.

IV.—KANT'S SPACE AND MODERN MATHEMATICS.

The remarkable modern speculations concerning non-Euclidean sorts of space, of which Prof. Helmholtz gave some account in No. III. of MIND, are likely to be hailed as one of the chief difficulties with which the Kantian theory of space will have to deal. "If we can imagine such spaces of other sorts," that learned writer tells us, "it cannot be maintained that the axioms of geometry are necessary consequences of an *a priori* transcendental form of intuition, as Kant thought".

Before attempting to answer this argument, let me briefly point out a fundamental error that appears to hinder many adepts of positive science from realising the true nature of problems belonging to the theory of knowledge, or critical metaphysics.

In our wanderings on the border between science and philosophy we are apt to forget that it is impossible to move on both sides of the boundary line at once, and that whoever crosses it shifts his problem as well as his method. In physics (taking the word in its widest sense) we must adopt a standard of truth, which in philosophy is the very thing to be settled. When a sufficient amount of accurate observation has been digested by correct reasoning, we hold the result to be the adequate expression of real existence. We admit a real world, independent of all appearance to anybody's sense or reason, and take for its exact counterpart the world that offers itself to the *mens sana in corpore sano* after exhausting all the means of research at the command of mankind. Science